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I. INTRODUCTION
While creating new knowledge is fundamental to economic de-
velopment,1 intellectual property is becoming a principle source of
wealth and wealth generation in developed countries like the United
States.2 In fact, since the 1980s, the United States has experienced a
"gradual but fundamental transformation from a manufacturing to an
information-based economy.",3 Unfortunately, due to the intangible
nature of ideas and the relative ease of appropriating them without the
knowledge of the author/owner, intellectual property is "vulnerable to
plunder."'4 Thus, The United States and other developed countries be-
' See Carlos Alberto Primo Braga, The Economics of Intellectual Property Rights
and the GATT: A View from the South, 22 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 243, 243-44
(1989).
2 See Francis Gurry, The Evolution of Technology and Markets and the Manage-
ment of Intellectual Property Rights, in PUBLIC POLICY AND GLOBAL TECHNOLOGI-
CAL INTEGRATION 25, 26 (Frederick M. Abbott & David J. Gerber eds., 1997). Cf.
J.H. Reichman, Universal Minimum Standards of Intellectual Property Protection
Under the TRIPs Component of the WTO Agreement, 29 INT'L LAW 345, 381-82
(1995) (asserting that intellectual property creations are "the most important source
of wealth for the twenty-first century economic development...").
3 Ruth L. Gana, Prospects for Developing Countries Under the TRIPs Agreement,
29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 735, 741 (1996). Cf. Gurry, supra note 2, at 25-26 (not-
ing increases in investment in intellectual capital on the part of major industrialized
nations).
4 R. Michael Gadbaw, Intellectual Property and International Trade: Merger or
Marriage of Convenience?, 22 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 223, 233 (1989).
The United States economy has moved steadily into areas where the value of
its products is tied to intellectual and artistic creativity. If these assets are as
vulnerable to plunder as the slow-moving merchant ships of the 1700s were to
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gan to use trade sanctions, treaties, and agreements to encourage
countries with markets for these ideas, but with less developed intel-
lectual property laws to enact, implement, and enforce prohibitions
against the misappropriation of intellectual property.5 Eventually, cor-
porations were able to urge the U.S. government to "use the leverage
inherent in access to the United States market as a means of stimulat-
ing countries to upgrade their level of protection.",6 The Agreement
on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) is a
culmination of these efforts requiring less developed countries to i-
the Barbary pirates, the United States' ability to trade with countries that har-
bor such pirates could be seriously hampered.
Id. at 233. See also Frederick M. Abbot, Protecting First World Assets in the Third
World: Intellectual Property Negotiations in the GATT Multilateral Framework, 22
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 691, 697 (1989).
5 See Doris Estelle Long, The Protection of Information in a Culturally Diverse
Marketplace, 15 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 129, 133-36 (1996) (review-
ing developed countries' incentives for encouraging the development of intellectual
property law abroad); ELISABETH UPHOFF, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND U.S. RE-
LATIONS WITH INDONESIA, MALAYSIA, SINGAPORE, AND THAILAND 12 (1991) (re-
viewing the use by the United States of Section 301 sanctions against certain South-
east Asian governments to protect its intellectual property rights abroad, pointing
out that "the Trade and Tariff Act of 1984 ... linked intellectual property protection
with trade policy for the first time). See generally Robert W. Kastenmeier & David
Beier, International Trade and Intellectual Property: Promise, Risks, and Reality,
22 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 285, 286-302 (1989) (providing an outline of intellec-
tual property's inclusion in international trade talks and the resultant implications);
see also generally A. Samuel Oddi, TRIPs - Natural Rights and a "Polite Form of
Economic Imperialism" 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 415, 423-27 (1996) (summariz-
ing the events that explain why the General Agreement of Tarriffs and Trade
(GATI) was chosen as a more effective venue for enforcing intellectual property
than the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO)); Gurry reviews the new
developments of intellectual property to exploit it on a worldwide level. He de-
scribes the variety of efforts to protect and exploit intellectual property through leg-
islation and treaty. He writes:
The rise of intellectual property has been, as one might expect, accompanied
by a push for greater protection of intellectual property as countries, industries
and enterprises with the greatest resources of intellectual capital seek to turn
these resources to their advantage. We are on the crest of the wave of a
movement for stronger protection.
Gurry, supra note 2, at 34-35.
6 Gadbaw, supra note 4, at 228.
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plement certain basic intellectual property laws in order to enjoy
membership in the World Trade Organization (WTO).7
The implementation of the intellectual property protection stan-
dards mandated by TRIPs appears simply to be a matter of enacting
conforming law. However, an effective structure of laws and en-
forcement procedures that will offer intellectual property the level of
protection anticipated by the West, while simultaneously encouraging
domestic innovation, is a rather multidimensional process facing
many potential pitfalls. A general review of intellectual property, the
TRIPs Agreement, and the difficulties facing countries as they up-
grade their intellectual property regimes will lay the groundwork for
an examination of the complex process of attaining TRIPs-mandated
intellectual property protection. This Note will focus on the political,
cultural, and economic difficulties facing a developing country as it
attempts to adopt and enforce Western intellectual property standards.
For example, this Note will explore how adopting dictated intellectual
property laws puts developing countries in a subordinate position that
challenges their sovereignty and creates further resentment toward the
West. Additional problems arise from forcing a country's citizens to
change their conception of property value to accept that intangible
ideas have owners that must be compensated. In the process, this Note
will attempt to answer the question: what economic, legal, and social
issues are involved when a non-Western, developing nation like Viet-
nam adopts Western-style intellectual property protection in order to
encourage foreign investment and involvement in world trade?
I1. BAsics OF TNTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
The notion of a property right residing in an individual's writ-
ings, creations, or inventions came into existence within the last few
hundred years. 8 As patronage became less available for artisans, the
cost of developing innovations increased. "Inventors and authors
needed incentives to expend the time, energy, and capital required to
keep the progress of science and the arts moving forward. These in-
centives were most often provided in the guise of protection for the
intangible property rights in which such advances were embodied...
7 See generally Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights, Marrakesh, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Eststablishing the World
Trade Organization [herinafter WTO Agreement]; Annex 1C, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS
- RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. 1125, 1197-99 (1994)
[hereinafter TRIPs Agreement] (providing the premise, nature, and scope of the ob-
ligations of WTO members in the preamble and art. 1 of the TRIPs Agreement).
8 See Long, supra note 5, at 133.
[Vol. 31:211
EFFORTS TO NORMALIZE AN LP. REGIME
,,9 The United States Constitution grants Congress the power to give
authors and inventors exclusive rights to their "Writings and Discov-
eries" in order to "promote the Progress of Science and Useful Arts."'
Therefore, the traditional justification for granting intellectual prop-
erty rights is to encourage artistic creation and innovation that would
remain unrealized without such protection. Later, the right of an indi-
vidual to be rewarded for his or her investment of effort and capital
was added as a justification for the granting of rights." Most recently,
it has been argued that the innovative or creative idea is property and
the owner has the right to protect it and benefit from it as with ordi-
nary property. 2
The concept of intellectual property incorporates two elements.
First, the ideas, inventions, and creations that result from private ac-
tivity, and second, the property status bestowed on those expressions
and ideas by the public. 13 Intellectual property has five basic forms:
copyright, patent, trademark, trade secrets, and mask works (to which
may be added industrial designs and utility models). 14 Briefly, copy-
right is the author's temporary right, usually lasting for his or her life-
time, to prevent others from making and, distributing commercial cop-
ies of his or her creative work.15 The copyrighted material must ex-
hibit some degree of originality.16 The author's exclusive right is lim-
ited by the fair use exception that allows some copying for personal
9 Id.
10 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
1 See ROBERT M. SHERWOOD, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ECONOMIC DEVEL-
OPMENT 37 (1990). (discussing three justifications that seem to be three parts of a
whole: reward theory, recovery theory, and risk theory). Sherwood's justifications
essentially state that the person who invests the time and money and endures the risk
associated with generating new ideas deserves to be rewarded or reimbursed for his
or her efforts. See id. at 37-39.
12 See Abbot, supra note 4, at 699 (stating that developed countries should argue
for support of increased intellectual property protection on the notion that they are
merely protecting "an increasingly important component of their national wealth").
13 See id. at711.
14 See id. at 712; see also Long, supra note 5, at 138-47 (providing a detailed re-
view of the traditional forms of and rights associated with intellectual property);
Basic Notions of Intellectual Property, WIPO Academy Geneva Oct. 4-15, 1993
(offering a summary of intellectual property, particularly in nations with developed
intellectual property systems).
15 See SHERWOOD, supra note 11, at 12.
16 See id.; see also Long, supra note 5, at 139-40.
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use, critical reviews, and educational purposes.17 Some countries, such
as The United States, protect software under copyright law.18 Simi-
larly, patents provide a temporary right to prevent others from using a
new invention.19 Generally, to be patentable, the innovation or inven-
tion must be "new, useful, and non-obvious., 20 A trademark is a word
or design used to designate a product and its source. 21 Finally, a mask
work is a layout design for a semiconductor chip. 2 This last category
falls between copyright and patent.2
Robert Sherwood identifies eight elements common to the five
forms of intellectual property that are "elements of a normative [or
highly developed intellectual property] regime., 24 This break-down of
intellectual property into common elements is particularly useful to
the discussion of what steps developing countries like Vietnam will
need to take to satisfy TRIPs levels of protection. The eight elements
are:
[1] the concept of an exclusive right; [2] the mechanism for creation of
the exclusive right; [3] the duration of the exclusive right; [4] the su-
pervening public interest; [5] the negotiability of the exclusive right;
[6] trans-border comity and accommodation; [7] enforcement of the
exclusive right; and [8] transition arrangements for marketplace ef-
fect.
25
First, at the core of intellectual property is the notion that the art-
ist or inventor has a conditional right to exclude others from using or
copying her work.26 Second, normative intellectual property regimes
will have in place mechanisms such as registration or some other
course of action before the government will enforce the right. 27 Third,
the duration of the right may be an arbitrary number of years be it
seventeen to twenty years for patents, the life of the author for copy-
17 See Long, supra note 5, at 139-40.
18 See id. at 140 & n.39.
19 See SHERWOOD, supra note 11, at 12.
20 See Long, supra note 5, at 141.
21 See SHERWOOD, supra note 11, at 12.
22 See id.
23 See id.
24 Id. at 28.
25 id.
26 See SHERWOOD, supra note 11, at 28.
27 See id. at 30.
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rights, or as long as the mark is used for trademarks.' Fourth, inter-
ests of public morality or a government's right of eminent domain will
supersede and circumscribe the rights of exclusivity, but these are
usually narrowly defined. 29 Fifth, often it is implicit that these rights
are property rights and are therefore subject to transfer to others for a
price. Sixth, more recently, international agreements require the rec-
ognition of these rights across national borders. 31 Seventh, mature in-
tellectual property regimes will have the means of enforcing these
rights. 2 Enforcement is practiced under three forms: private action,
criminal action, and national border monitoring.33 Finally, transition
arrangements allow for the protection of an idea before it is fully
commercialized. 34
I. BACKGROUND OF THE TRIPs AGREEMENT
With the basic elements of intellectual property and a mature in-
tellectual property regime in mind, we turn to the global situation that
gave rise to TRIPs.35 According to Hansen's categorizations, countries
of the world may be divided into three groups in relation to their
"production and consumption of intellectual property products. 36
First, are the net sellers and exporters of intellectual property.37 These
are developed countries such as the United States who want to obtain
28 See id. at 31.
29 See id. at 32.
30 See id.
31 See SHERWOOD, supra note 11, at 33.
32 See id. at 34-35.
33 See id. at 35.
34 See id. at 36.
35 The varied motivations that directed the path to the TRIPs Agreement are thor-
oughly documented. See generally THE GATT URUGUAY ROuND: A NEGOTIATING
HISTORY (1986-1992) Ch. 2 (Terence P. Stewart ed., 1993) (discussing the negotiat-
ing background of the Uruguay Round and the TRIPs Agreement); see Frederick M.
Abbott, Protecting First World Assets in the Third World: Intellectual Property Ne-
gotiations in the GATT Multilateral Framework, 22 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 689
(1989) (the papers and articles presented at this symposium provide a thorough dis-
cussion of the historical background, intellectual property development, economic
climate, and motivations that laid the foundation for the TRIPs Agreement).
36 Hugh C. Hansen, International Copyright: An Unorthodox Analysis, 29 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 579, 582 (1996).
37 See id.
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increased value for their exported technology, 38 while at the same time
broadening worldwide protection. 39 The second group are those de-
veloped or newly developed countries "with the resources and indus-
tries to become net sellers and exporters."'4 These countries seek
broad worldwide protection in addition to increased domestic protec-
tion as an incentive for local industry to develop intellectual property
and to compete better at home and abroad. The final group are net us-
ers and importers of intellectual property.41 These countries are devel-
oping or newly developed and seek to provide protection, at least
within their own borders. 42
The econonomies of developed countries are transforming into
information-based economies. Greater amounts of innovation and in-
vestment are tied up in and represented by intellectual propdrty.4 3 This
has created an impetus for obtaining greater value for these creative
38 See Long, supra note 5, at 135.
39 See Hansen, supra note 36, at 582.
40 See id. at 582.
41 See id.
42 See id.
43 See Abbott, supra note 4, at 692 (stating that "intellectual property has become
an increasingly important component of national wealth"). The increasing world
focus on intellectual property which gave rise to TRIPs is a "single response to eco-
nomic and industrial change." Gurry, supra note 2, at 25. This change is bringing
about an economy whose main source of income is intellectual rather than physical
capital. Id. Thus,
[I]nvestment in the generation of intellectual capital through research and de-
velopment (R&D) has steadily increased across the industrialized countries...
• [F]rom 1972 to 1991, the amount of research invested in R&D by the G7
countries increased from an average of 1.8% of GDP to an average of 2.25%
of GDP.
Id. at 25-26 (citing NAT. SCIENCE BD., SCIENCE AND ENGINEERING INDICATORS at
appendix table 4-35 (1993)). In response to this phenomenon, Reichman provides
two rational bases for why the standards for intellectual property protection need to
be stepped up:
First, the growing capacity of manufacturers in developing countries to pene-
trate distant markets for traditional industrial products has forced the devel-
oped countries to rely more heavily on their comparative advantages in the
production of intellectual goods .... Second, the rise of knowledge-based in-
dustries radically altered the nature of competition .... [T]he resulting inno-
vation embodied in today's high-tech products has increasingly become vul-
nerable to free-riding appropriators.
Reichman, supra note 2, at 346.
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endeavors. In other words, corporations, having invested heavily in
research, design, technology development, and other creative products
(such as movies and music), desire to send these products into the
burgeoning global market and reap a wealthy return on their invest-
ment.44 However, sending products into areas without laws and ad-
ministrative structures to protect property interests will expose these
products to piracy. Profits will be siphoned off to third parties. 45 In-
deed, given the highly exploitable nature of intangible intellectual
property4 and the ease of copying it, such products, once introduced
into world markets, face the threat of unauthorized copying and use,
regardless of national boundaries. 47
Beginning in the 1980s, the value of unrealized sales lost to pi-
racy provided enough attention-getting data to inspire developed
countries to seek more stringent protection abroad. Companies in de-
veloped countries never realized these billions of potential dollars in
sales due to piracy.48 For example, the International Intellectual Prop-
44 See generally Gurry, supra note 2, at 26 (noting that when intellectual capital
becomes a primary source of income, "intellectual property assumes critical signifi-
cance as a means of control of the... potentially most commercially attractive ele-
ments of intellectual capital").
45 It was just such an exposure to pirating and huge losses in unrealized sales that
led developed nations to seek stronger protection. See Uphoff, supra note 5, at 6-7.
See also Eric H. Smith Worldwide Copyright Protection Under the TRIPs Agree-
ment, 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 559, 560 (1996) (stating that, in the past, certain
areas of the world provided essentially no protection for intellectual property, and
consequently, piracy in those areas resulted in trade losses).
46 "Intellectual property is peculiarly adapted to exploitation within global markets.
Being the intangible expression of... information, it may, unlike physical property,
be used simultaneously in different physical markets." Smith, supra note 45, at 560;
see also UPHOFF, supra note 5 (describing the establishment by the United States of
a uniform policy against the piracy of Western products by a number of Southeast
Asian countries).
47 Uphoff points out that "advances in reproduction technology have made it much
easier to copy books, audio/videotapes, movies, etc." Uphoff, supra note 5, at 7.
Additionally, "the intangible nature of intellectual property complicates detection of
its unlawful appropriation, particularly given modern technology, and the public,
even in countries considered vigilant about protecting rights in such property, re-
mains more tolerant of its infringement than of virtually any other form of illegal
activity." WILLIAM P. ALFORD, To STEAL A BOOK IS AN ELEGANT OFFENSE: INTEL-
LECTUAL PROPERTY LAW IN CHINESE CIVILIZATION 6 (1995). Losses to piracy in
both developed and lesser developed countries exceed hundreds of millions of dol-
lars. See generally Smith, supra note 45, at 560-65.
48 See generally Smith, supra note 45, at 568 (providing U.S. trade loss figures for
the piracy of intellectual property products for 1994). See also Kastenmeier & Beier,
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erty Alliance (IPA) reported that, in 1994, The United States suffered
over $11.6 billion in lost potential income to piracy outside the United
States.49 Other estimates claimed losses of up to $40 billion a year due
to unauthorized copying. ° Interestingly, U.S. domestic piracy is the
biggest offender in dollar terms. In 1994, losses to domestic U.S. pi-
racy amounts to $2.9 billion compared to $866 million in China in
that same year.5' Developed countries usually have higher dollar
losses from piracy than less developed countries. 2 Smith points out
that this is because as countries become more developed, their mar-
kets expand in size accompanied by a greater proliferation of copying
technology like VCRs. Thus, while the level of piracy as a percentage
of the overall market drops, the dollar amount lost to piracy rises. This
is offset, however, by the overall increase in sales resulting from the
expanded market.53
supra note 5, at 286 (reviewing how the increasing concern for protecting intellec-
tual property led to using trade talks to encourage greater intellectual property pro-
tection abroad.)
49 See Smith, supra note 45, at 568. According to the data compiled by the IHPA for
1994, U.S. companies lost a staggering $1.265 billion to piracy in Japan and $866
million in China while experiencing a more modest loss of $103 million in Malaysia
and a relatively minor sum of $5.2 million in Vietnam. Id. at 562. However, quanti-
fying the actual dollar amounts is highly problematic. This is so because one must
consider not only the degree of unauthorized appropriation, but also the level of lost
revenue opportunities, both of which are unknown factors. See Abbot, supra note 4,
at 699-700.
50 See Kastenmeier & Beier, supra note 5, at 286.
51 See Smith, supra note 45, at 562-65.
52 The biggest offenders, outside the U.S. itself, are Japan at $1.3 billion, Germany
at $1.2 billion, China at $866 million, and Russia at $805 million. See id.
53 See id. at 563. To illustrate, take two hypothetical countries of approximately
equal population; country A and country B. Country A is less developed, and only a
small ratio of homes, one in fifty, has a VCR. Assume that the potential market for
video tapes of the movie Star Wars in country A is quite small, totaling 10,000 cop-
ies. Assume further that, given country A's low level of copyright enforcement, the
piracy rate is 75%. Therefore, potentially 7,500 copies of Star Wars in country A
will be pirated. Country B, on the other hand, is highly developed, and a large num-
ber of homes, one in two, have VCRs. Assume that the market for Star Wars videos
in country B is quite large, totaling over 250,000 copies. Assume further that, given
country B's high level of copyright enforcement, the piracy rate is a low 10%.
Therefore, potentially over 25,000 copies of Star Wars in country B will be pirated.
Thus, even though the piracy rate is considerably lower in country B, the total num-
ber of pirated copies, and therefore revenue losses, are considerably higher in coun-
try B than in country A.
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These increasing losses to piracy combined with a widening trade
deficit and a perceived faltering of The United States' worldwide eco-
nomic dominance opened the ear of the U.S. government to the com-
plaints of U.S. companies. Uphoff states that
The sudden emergence of intellectual property protection as a major
goal of U.S. foreign economic policy in the mid-1980s was a result
both of an objective change in the value of intellectual property, and of
the domestic political debate over how to respond to the trade deficit
and the relative decline of American economic power. The policy was
formed with considerable participation by the private sector in defining
issues and problems, identifying countries, and supplying information.
The result was an active - perhaps interventionist - foreign policy
that tended to be inward looking and inflexible because of its role in
the broader debate over trade.
5 4
Uphoff's statement indicates that from this point on, intellectual
property protection and trade are linked. Companies saw that the U.S.
government - and governments of other developed countries -
could make access to their markets conditional upon implementing
stronger levels of protection.55 Eventually, industry groups convinced
the government to act.5 6 The U.S. government initially demanded that
countries where piracy was occurring enforce intellectual property
protection or face trade sanctions. 57 Later, as these industry groups
convinced their governments that the reason for the piracy problem
was inadequate intellectual property protection, the governments in
turn sought higher levels of protection through multinational ac-
cords.58 It was hoped that, through economic pressure and resulting
agreements, countries with inadequate protection would pass stronger
laws and enact stronger enforcement procedures. By so doing, profits
would be transferred from the hands ofyirating citizens to the compa-
nies that developed the original product.
M UPHOFF, supra note 5, at 12.
55 See Gadbaw, supra note 4, at 228. See also Oddi, supra note 5, at 415,424. Oddi
writes: "[i]ndustry groups (lobbyists) in developed countries, particularly in the
United States, found a receptive government ear to their plea that their intellectual
property was being 'counterfeited,' 'pirated,' 'stolen,' and 'infringed' to their detri-
ment and to the detriment of intellectual property-exporting countries by a generally
bad lot in certain countries."
56 See Oddi, supra note 5 at 424.
57 See UPHOFF, supra note 5.
58 See id. at 6-12; see Long, supra note 5, at 135; Oddi, supra note 5, at 425.
59 See Oddi, supra note 5, at 425; see also Long, supra note 5, at 135.
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This illustrates, to some degree, the problem of intellectual prop-
erty protection on the international level. Sufficient protection re-
quires sovereign nations to rewrite their own laws at the behest of a
foreign state in order to protect the intangible property of that foreign
state's nationals. By providing such protection, the developing coun-
try forgoes a "potential economic windfall," 6 since cheaply distrib-
uted copies would be replaced by more expensive, authorized prod-
ucts protected by an expensive intellectual property regime. This ten-
sion explains, in part, the inadequacy of intellectual property protec-
tion features both locally and internationally before TRIPs.
Before TRIPs, countries had at least rudimentary forms of intel-
lectual property laws that went unenforced. 61 The Berne and Paris
Conventions, which cover patent and copyright enforcement among
member nations, were criticized for their lack of enforcement proce-
dures and failure to cover certain important subject matter areas, such
as trade secrets. 62 Later, the World Intellectual Property Organization
(WIPO) also failed to effectively deal with the problem of intellectual
property infringement. Under WIPO, developing countries exerted
enough power as a group to create a stalemate with developed coun-
tries over revision of the Paris Convention. 63 However, the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) provided a much more ef-
fective means for developed countries to exert pressure on other coun-
tries to modify their intellectual property systems. Developed coun-
tries could use trade and access to their markets to encourage adoption
of stronger intellectual property enforcement.6a This shift from WIPO
to GATT and the use of trade as a means for encouraging stiffer intel-
lectual property protection gave worldwide intellectual property pro-
tection a fundamental trade aspect.65 By so doing, "developed coun-
60 See Abbot, supra note 4, at 697.
61 See Smith, supra note 45, at 572. See generally UPHOFF, supra note 5 (Singa-
pore, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Thailand all had intellectual property laws enacted
while these countries will still colonies of European countries but they were ineffec-
tually enforced and not well developed.)
62 See Abbot, supra note 4, at 703-07. See Paris Convention for the Protection of
Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1883, July 14, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 1583 (last reviewed at
Stockholm, July 14, 1967) [hereinafter Paris Convention]; Berne Convention for the
Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, July 24, 1971, 828 U.N.T.S. 221 [herein-
after Berne Convention].
63 See Oddi, supra note 5, at 424.
64 Reichman, supra note 2, at 385.
65 See Oddi, supra note 5, at 425. Otten and Wager assert that, "due to the place of
the TRIPs Agreement within the trading system it can be expected that over the
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tries have implicitly acknowledged that compensation has become the
new master principle."' TRIPs then emerged as a prerequisite to
membership in the newly organized World Trade Organization which
arose from GATT.67
IV. APPLYING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY STANDARDS ACROSS BORDERS
Before turning to the TRIPs Agreement specifically, it is impor-
tant to look at the difficulties and problems faced in creating transna-
tional intellectual property standards and convincing other countries
to adopt these standards. These major problems are (1) the suitability
of applying standards derived in one culture across others,68 (2) the
socioeconomic cost and resulting dependency associated with higher
levels of protection, 69 and, to a lesser degree, (3) public discontent
coming years there will be something close to universal acceptance of its obliga-
tions." Adrien Otten & Hannu Wager, Compliance with TRIPs: The Emerging World
View 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 391, 394 (1996). Additionally, they claim that,
"[u]nder the WTO, the failure of a country to meet its TRIPs obligations can put its
market access rights and other benefits in jeopardy." Id.
6 Reichman, supra note 2, at 385 & n. 309.
67 Gana provides an excellent theoretical basis for the TRIPs Agreement:
The impetus behind the TRIPs Agreement is a combination of two inextrica-
ble objectives: (1) to secure global economic rewards of an intellectual prop-
erty grant, and (2) to facilitate the enforcement of these rights as a means to
accomplish the first objective. By situating the TRIPs Agreement in the
framework of multilateral trade relations, the Agreement benefits from the in-
creased incentive for nations to enforce intellectual property rights through the
threat of trade sanctions. Like a wheel, the TRIPs Agreement envisages that
the threat of trade sanctions will propel the forward motion of respect and pro-
tection of copyrights worldwide.
Gana, supra note 3, at 759.
6 See Long, supra note 5, at 154.
69 See generally Reichman, supra note 2, at 354, 382-83 (noting that a patent sys-
tem may cause greater dependence on foreign patents and that "integrating intellec-
tual property law into greater economic law necessarily imposes short and medium-
term social costs on the developing countries"). See also Braga, supra note 1, at
256-57 (indicating that stiffer intellectual property protection will result in greater
costs due to increased "royalty payments to foreigners," displacement of domestic
firms "devoted to piracy," the "opportunity cost of additional domestic R&D," and
increased costs due to monopolization); UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE
AND DEVELOPMENT, THE TRIPS AGREEMENT AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, PRE-
PARED BY THE U.N.CTAD SECRETARIAT, UNITED NATIONS NEW YORK AND GENEVA
14, at 2-3 (1996). [hereinafter U.N. CONFERENCE] (reviewing briefly the economic
implications of adopting higher intellectual property standards).
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over perceived challenges to national pride and autonomy.70 Attempts
to adopt TRIPs standards in Vietnam will come up against these prob-
lems, although the trade incentive should be a strong motivator to en-
courage Vietnam to accommodate higher protection.
A. Culture and Social Attitudes
Trade is one means of getting around the divisiveness that exists be-
tween competing types of intellectual property protection. In fact, since
the Berne and Paris Conventions first met in the late nineteenth century,
debate has continued over the type and scope of protection that should be
offered to intellectual property. Doris Long points out that "[t]he posi-
tions taken by various nations in these debates reflect their differing (and
often irreconcilable) philosophical, cultural, historical, economic, and
political points of view regarding the need for strong protection of tech-
nology and other products of the mind.,
7 2
Two competing systems emerged among the developed nations
that reflect differing cultural backgrounds: the Anglo-American eco-
nomic system with its notions of the free exchange of property,73 and
the "Continental 'author's rights' system with its concomitant fascina-
tion with [the author's] 'moral rights."' 74 Countries in either of these
two systems created and enforced "regimes of protection that were
economically and philosophically compatible with their cultures." 75
Thus, France, with its emphasis on moral rights, grants artist's rights
70 Braga points out that "[n]o government likes to be perceived as submitting to
foreign threats. Once retaliation is implemented, domestic support for stronger intel-
lectual property rights protection may be negatively affected." Braga, supra note 1,
at 263. Public support for changes to intellectual property laws often falters or be-
comes assertively negative when it appears that a government is bowing to the de-
mands of the West. For example, critics of the government at Taipei called Taiwan's
commitment to pass laws concerning intellectual property a "national humiliation"
because the United States had dictated new laws to its elected officials. See ALFORD,
supra note 47, at 106. Similarly, a Thailand faction balked at what it felt was U.S.
"trade harassment" and dissuaded its government from enacting revised intellectual
property laws that could be regarded by the public as concessionary. See UPHOFF,
supra note 5, at 44.
71 See Long, supra note 5, at 154 & n.96.
72 Id.
73 See Hansen, supra note 36, at 580.
74 Id.
75 Id.
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in paintings even after the painting is sold.76 An artist may prohibit a
buyer two or three transactions later from altering or destroying the
work even though the artist no longer owns the actual piece.7' This is
presumably in accord with French notions of artistic creation. Once
produced by the creative forces acting upon the artist, the artwork
should remain unchanged from its original form. This also protects the
interest the artist has in his body of work and the jRublic's interest in
preserving culture through unsullied works of art. In contrast, U.S.
artists have no such rights once a painting is sold. The artist's rights in
the original work generally end with remuneration.7 9 The work be-
comes a commodity to be sold or manipulated according to the inter-
ests of the current owner.80 The U.S. approach follows a tradition of
"crass mercantilism" which allows the person who pays for the work
absolute rights over it as a commodity or commercial item.8 1
This brief example demonstrates that intellectual property rights
are rooted in the culture, philosophy, and national character of the in-
dividual country. France's concern for art and culture and the U.S.'
concern for free markets have given rise to two distinct approaches to
the rights of artists in their works. Western developed countries have
for a century debated and worked out the competing demands of their
respective intellectual property systems as they relate to international
trade. However, Western countries have ignored the same potential
for difference among less developed nations. Long advises that:
The problem with enforcement of intellectual property rights in many
Third World and underdeveloped countries arises in large part from the
disalignment of western views of intellectual property rights with cul-
ture, history, and legal traditions of developing and emerging market-
place countries. This disalignment can only be overcome if cultural
differences are absorbed into international standards.82
76 See Henry Hansmann & Marina Santilli, Authors' and Artists' Moral Rights: A
Comparative Legal and Economic Analysis, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 95, 99-100 (Jan.
1997) (describing how French artist Bernard Buffet retained rights to a refrigerator
door he had painted after its sale to a third party).
71 See id.
78 See id. at 102-06. ("... great works of art often become important elements in a
community's culture: other works of art are created in response to them, and they
become common reference points or icons that are widely shared in social commu-
nication").
79 See id. at 106.
80 See id. at 103.
81 See id. at 96.
82 See Long, supra note 5, at 166.
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Unfortunately, international standards are dictated by a few de-
veloped countries. It is unclear what form intellectual property rights
or what variety of rights may have developed in individual countries,
but it appears that if these countries wish to benefit from open trade,
they will need to conform to a variation of the two themes propounded
by Europe and the United States. Given the peculiar social, political,
and cultural forms that gave rise to Western intellectual property, the
disalignment Long mentions can only serve to disrupt and complicate
the process of establishing world-wide intellectual property protection
standards given the wide variety of cultural norms.
Because the TRIPs Agreement partakes heavily of Western atti-
tudes and conceptions towards individuality, human value, rights, re-
ward, invention, and discovery and imposes them upon non-Western
countries, TRIPs has been criticized as a modern vehicle of Western
imperialism. 83 According to Hamilton, belief in Western style copy-
right law requires acceptance of the canon of individualism, reward,
and commodification. 84 Western copyright - or particularly Anglo-
American copyright - values individual creative effort, singles out
83 See Marci A. Hamilton, The TRIPs Agreement: Imperialistic, Outdated, and
Overprotective, 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 613, 616 (1996). "TRIPs attempts to
remake international copyright law in the image of Western copyright law. If TRIPs
is successful across the breathtaking sweep of signatory countries, it will be one of
the most effective vehicles of Western imperialism in history." Id. Rosemary J.
Coombe, Authorial Cartographies: Mapping Proprietary Borders in a Less-Than-
Brave New World, 48 STAN. L. REv. 1357, 1360 (1996). Coombe adds:
The very tropes of discovery, invention, naming, and originality that animate
modern intellectual property laws emerge from a historical era in which Euro-
peans mapped the world in their own image - ignoring the human ecologies
of others and denying any value to the preexisting worlds of meaning in which
such phenomena figured ontologically and spiritually.
Id. See also Long, supra note 5, at 166 (noting that "the problem with enforcement
of intellectual property rights in many Third World and underdeveloped countries
arises in large part from the disalignment of western views of intellectual property
rights with the culture, history, and legal traditions of developing and emerging
marketplace countries"). The fact that the policy being advanced by governments is
driven by industry groups does "smack of economic imperialism against uppity 'pi-
rate' states who deign to compete by 'imitation' . .. ." Oddi, supra note 5, at 470.
Hamilton notes that the "United States is ... endorsing the imposition of a revolu-
tion-tending construct of the person. Individualism, as captured in the Western intel-
lectual property system, is the sine qua non for a society to recognize and honor
personal liberty." Id. And goes so far as to state: "TRIPs is nothing less than free-
dom imperialism." Hamilton, supra note 83, at 617.
84 Hamilton, supra note 83, at 617.
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the creative individual for reward, values original expression, and be-
lieves that products are capable of disassociation from the artist to be
sent through commerce.8 5 These ideals are fundamentally incompati-
ble with some of the cultural and political underpinnings of non-
Western countries - particularly Asian countries based upon Confu-
cian ideals like Vietnam which value continuity with the past and
group identities.8 6 It has been argued that "[a] people must value indi-
vidual achievement and believe in the appropriateness of change and
originality if it is going to concede to and adopt a Western-style intel-
lectual property regime."87 It will be interesting to see to what degree
countries will adapt their own cultural and political ideologies in order
to take advantage of the markets and trade access that is available
with adherence to TRIPs. Some form of resistance from within these
countries is inevitable. 8
Even in the United States, attitudes about intellectual property
rights are less than uniform. The free and unhindered flow of ideas
and culture are deeply ingrained even in the West.89 Payment for ex-
pressions of ideas and cultural items (like music) are not necessarily
universal ways of viewing intellectual property. Hansen wryly notes
that "the U.S. consumer views intellectual property as a hindrance to
immediate gratification and home-taping as something guaranteed by
the Bill of Rights."'9 Evidently, notions of property and ownership are
85 See id. Although, as noted above, the idea of commodification differs between
Western nations since moral rights countries give the creator rights over artwork
even after it is sent into the stream of commerce. See Gana, supra note 3, at 730
(stating that "TRIPs asks "developing countries ... to conform to a system and phi-
losophy of laws and values which are alien, and in some cases, in direct conflict
with frameworks which historically have sustained these societies").
8 See Gana, supra note 3, at 764-67 (describing at length China's resistance to
"modem intellectual property" concepts due to its traditionally Confucian values
and norms).
87 Hamilton, supra note 83, at 613.
88 See Gana, supra note 3, at 770-71.
89 See Hamilton, supra note 83, at 625-26 (discussing tension between views on
dissemination of information espoused by the computer experts or "hackers" and
owners of copyrightable works. The hackers espouse the motto: "Information wants
to be free"). Hamilton states that "[s]ome go so far as to argue that barriers to infor-
mation, including copyright, are outdated impediments to truth and exploration.
They opine that copyright is an arcane phenomenon linked to the printing press that
will be swept under the tide of the emerging on-line environment." Id.
90 Hansen, supra note 36, at 587.
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rooted in tangible items. Intangible items are harder to assign a mone-
tary value. Hansen notes that:
Everybody thinks that it [is] wrong to shoplift the videocassette from a
store. On the other hand, almost everybody considers it appropriate to
videotape that same forty dollar movie from a television set. Thus, it
appears the inexpensive but tangible videocassette is valued more than
the expensive but intangible intellectual property.
91
However, Americans likely regard the expropriation of patents
and trademarks as inappropriate. 92 In terms of personal use, however,
Americans appear to feel that intellectual property, particularly films
and literature, may be freely expropriated. Thus, even in the United
States, intellectual property is not valued in the same way as tangible
property. If the recording, film, or software industries wish to change
this method of valuation, they must first educate Western and non-
Western consumers alike as to the value of intangible intellectual
property and the immorality of its free reproduction. 94
Cultural and social attitudes reflect the notion that intangible
property is or should be freely distributed. Organizations and govern-
ments seeking to establish intellectual property protection will need to
surmount individual intuitive notions of value and apply an appropri-
ate valuation for intangible ideas. In Asia, this problem with intellec-
tual property "stems from the Confucian view that information should
be shared without concern for compensation." 95 Additionally, some
tribal cultures "have a community view of property and information
that does not readily translate to the individual proprietorship view of
technology that underlies much of the Western Europ ean and United
States approach to the protection of technology."9 Inspiring non-
91 Id. at 588.
92 Especially in the case of trademarks, given the market confusion and harm that
can result when manufacturers of poor quality goods adopt the trademark of a
trusted manufacturer of quality items in order to deceive consumers. For example,
"Chinese pharmaceutical manufacturers have found their marks infringed - at
times with fatal consequences for consumers." ALFORD, supra note 47, at 87. Since
the unauthorized manufacture of patented drugs (or airplane parts) under expropri-
ated trade names may result in injury or death, trademarks and patents are going to
be taken more seriously than are copyrights and recognized as rights important to
assure public safety.
93 This is true to the point that the fair use exception is granted. See Long, supra
note 5, at 139.
94 Cf. Hansen, supra note 36, at 582.
95 Long, supra note 5, at 156-57 & n.106.
96 Id. at 157.
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Western developing nations to adopt and enforce a system that may be
at odds with deeply held cultural and social practices will require
something of a missionary effort to convert individuals to Western
ways of thinking.97
B. Protection and Economic Dependence
Another complicating feature of intellectual property law adoption is
the desire of developing countries to permit free copying until that coun-
try's own inventors and economies have a chance to catch up to the level
of development enjoyed by other countries. 98 Countries lacking that level
of development desire free access to patented technology and copy-
righted products in order to develop both their technical know-how and
economies such that they can begin to develop their own intellectual
property. 99 Conversely, countries that have expended a great deal of
97 See Hansen, supra note 36, at 579-82. August & Buchenhorner note that:
It is important to remember that many of the countries where intellectual
property protection is weak have a past of colonialism, protectionism, and
Communism. Strong IP [intellectual property] protection has not been a part
of those cultures. Thus, a large part of the enforcement effort in the hostile
environments is education of the public to promote greater respect for IP
rights. There are many vehicles, such as trade organizations, useful for educat-
ing the public.
Casey P. August & Michael J. Buchenhorner, Strategies for Developing Intellectual
Property Portfolios in the Global Environment: Protection of Intellectual Property
in Hostile Environments, 21 CAN.-U.S. L. J. 261, 274 (1995).
98 See Uphoff, supra note 5, at 1 (stating that "many developing countries argue
that they need free access to ideas and technology in order to 'catch up' with the
industrialized countries"). Carter Mackley, Note, The Role of the Patent System in
Technology Transfer: The Japanese Experience, 26 CoLuM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 131,
164 (1987) (describing how Japan allowed free copying "as a method of allowing
domestic industry to develop"); Long, supra note 5, at 162-63 (stating that lesser
developed countries see themselves as needing open access to intellectual property
in order to develop economically);. See generally Martin J. Adelman & Sonia
Baldia, Prospects and Limits of the Patent Protection in the TRIPs Agreement: The
Case of India, 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 507, 527-28 (1996) (pointing out that
some countries, particularly India, have adopted a free-rider strategy whereby they
take advantage of other countries' patented products by avoiding the cost of devel-
opment through reengineering).
99 For example, Chinese officials in the 1980s argued that China, as a developing
nation, could not afford to pay royalties on works of science and technology that
were needed for growth. Thus, state-owned bookstores became filled with pirated
copies of technical books that were off-limits to all but Chinese citizens. However,
non-technical books such as novels were also made available in these bookstores in
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wealth developing advanced intellectual property wish to protect their
investment. 100 Discoveries and inventions are all built upon the ideas and
research of predecessors. Developing countries do not possess large
amounts of protected data from which to draw on, nor do they enjoy na-
tionally created technological basis for further innovation.101 Given this
void, developing nations often use other nations' products to assist in
their growth.' °2 Earlier in its history the United States, before it enjoyed
its own cadre of writers and artists, published and pirated European
writer's works without copyright protection thus providing greater access
of these works to Americans.1°3 Further, low standards of patent protec-
tion have helped countries like India and Brazil distribute and develop
pharmaceuticals. 104 Before World War U1 Japan tolerated the copying of
imports to help spur its economic development, and continued along such
a path until the strict enforcement of patent rights of foreigners precondi-
tioned its receipt of more advanced technologies. 10 5 Thus, "[a]ttempts to
restrict a nation's internal access to technology through the enactment of
international protection norms are seen by many developing countries as
a direct threat to their ability to play a significant role in the world econ-
omy.,
,16
pirated form. See ALFORD, supra note 47, at 86. Additionally, Gana points out that
low standards of patent protection have helped some developing countries build
local industries, especially pharmaceuticals. See Gana, supra note 3, at 746. Thus,
India'a pharmaceutical manufacturing industry grew because it was able to reengi-
neer products due to a lax patent system in that country and sell them more profita-
bly than foreign companies because of a high tariff. See Adelman and Baldia, supra
note 98, at 527. See also Mackley, supra note 98, at 144 (explaining that Japanese
officials in 1899 worried that advanced technology from foreign countries would
"dominate domestic markets with their patent monopolies and impede national in-
dustrial development").
1oo See Long, supra note 5, at 135.
101 See id. at 162.
102 See id.
103 See id. at 162-63. Formal protection for foreign copyrighted materials was not
granted in U.S. until 1891. See ALFORD, supra note 47, at 5. The Berne protections
were originally formulated five years later in 1886. See Berne Convention, supra
note 62.
'04 See Gana, supra note 3, at 746.
'05 See Mackley, supra note 98, at 164-65. The author of this note argues that given
the Japanese success with loose intellectual property protection, other countries
might similarly benefit early on in their economic development and only suffer a
short term loss of international respect. See id. at 165.
'06 Long, supra note 5, at 163.
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By imposing higher levels of protection in developing countries
for intellectual property, TRIPs creates the potential problem of eco-
nomic dependence on developed countries.1w Because the value of
patent systems to developing countries remains dubious, the stiffer
laws could cause a growing dependence on foreign patents since a
country would be unable to lay the technological ground-work suffi-
cient to begin developing their own innovations.' The developing
country would be forced into continued reliance on developed coun-
tries for technology, thus remaining a consumer rather than a partici-
pant in world innovation and trade.1' 9
V. THE UNnTD STATES V. SOUTHEAST ASIA: LESSONS FOR TRIPs
Uphoff discusses in detail the battles over trade and intellectual
property rights that four Southeast Asian countries had with the
United States during the late 1980s. Her study provides interesting
case studies that illustrate the struggles of enacting and enforcing
heightened protection.10 The four countries, Singapore, Indonesia,
Malaysia, and Thailand, each responded to U.S. pressure in unique
ways. In 1985, Singapore was considered the world capital of pi-
racy. " ' Foreigners found no clearly authorized place to register copy-
rights and convictions for copyright violations were "too low to be
much of a deterrent." 2 In fact, companies complained that pirates113
just considered the small fines as part of doing business. But, fac-
tors were at work that would soon resulted in Singapore's adoption
and enforcement of an intellectual property regime that would signifi-
cantly reduce piracy.
Beginning in 1979, the Singaporean government announced a
second industrial revolution that transformed Singapore into a high-
107 See Reichman, supra note 2, at 354 (explaining this problem as it relates to the
system of patents).
10' See id.
109 See S. K. Verma, TRIPs - Development and Transfer of Technology, 27 IIC
331, 364 (1996). See also Oddi, supra note 5, at 460 (stating that the lack of incen-
tives to encourage technological development in lesser developed countries will
cause them to remain consumer countries and not eventual intellectual property de-
velopers).
110 See generally UPHOFF, supra note 5.
". See id. at 13 & n.1.
112 Id.
113 See id. at 14.
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technology-oriented economy.114 "In 1981, the Singapore Government
initiated a computerization plan that included making Singapore the
software capital of Asia through a strategy of alliances with foreign
computer companies."" 5 However, by 1984, Singapore's position on
copyright protection was still lacking. The passage of the Trade and
Tariff Act of that year made Singapore realize that intellectual prop-
erty protection issues were factors that The United States would en-
force through trade legislation. Additionally, American software com-
panies refused to make the deals that Singapore sought in stating that
the U.S. software industry wanted and would continue to push for
complete protection for all industries using copyright.11 6
Following these developments, Singapore's attitude toward intel-
lectual property changed dramatically. In 1987, it enacted a new copy-
right act that conformed to international law and met U.S. requests.
The enactment protected computer programs and substantially raised
the penalty for infringement to a maximum of $5,100 in fines and up
to five years in prison.1 7 Enforcement stepped up considerably as
well.1 8 U.S. losses to piracy reportedly fell to $10 million from $358
million as a result of Singapore's pro-active enforcement efforts."l 9
Once Singapore decided to act, it moved decisively and piracy nearly
vanished.
Singapore's new industrial revolution required joint ventures with
software companies that considered copyright protection of para-
mount importance. Thus, for Singapore, copyright protection became
part of its overall development strategy.120 Once it made this decision,
Singapore quickly and decisively implemented stringent intellectual
property protection after a decade of near inaction.121
Malaysia's intellectual property protection was, by American
standards, just as weak as that of Singapore. However, Malaysia's
114 See id. at 19.
115 Id. at 14 & n.5.
116 See UPHOFF, supra note 5, at 15.
117 See id. at 16.
118 Uphoff provides one effective example of Singapore's enforcement efforts, stat-
ing that the police "formed a special intellectual property unit and the High Courts
made frequent use of Anton Pillar orders (which allow a plaintiff to search the de-
fendant's premises for incriminating evidence if there is danger it might be de-
stroyed). Under this onslaught, piracy vanished very quickly" Id. at 17.
119 See Id.
120 See id. at 18-19.
121 See id. at 18-20.
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adoption of an intellectual property regime was not due to trade pres-
sure, but rather, out of admiration and envy of Singapore's successes.
Following Singapore's lead, Malaysia adopted a plan to develop its
own software and computer industry through joint ventures with for-
eign computer companies.' 22 Recognizing that this plan could not pre-
vent piracy, Malaysia engaged in a race with Singapore to adopt strin-
gent copyright laws and, hence, encourage Western cooperation.2
Indonesia's road to strict intellectual property protection differed
from the previously discussed countries. During the mid-1980s, pi-
rated tapes from Indonesia were exported throughout the region.
Much to the chagrin of the Indonesian pirates, these high quality tapes
were later copied by pirates located in Singapore.12 The Indonesian
government responded with apparent disinterest, until late 1985, when
Indonesian pirated copies of the Live Aid concert to benefit African
famine victims appeared in Europe. Organizer Bob Geldof protested
to the Indonesian government and eventually launched a campaign
against Indonesia for accommodating piracy."
Moreover, an incident when an Indonesian businessman was
caught bringing pirated tapes into The United States using a diplo-
matic bag, deeply embarrassed Indonesia.12 This, coupled with a
movement amongst Indonesian artists for stronger copyright protec-
tion, led Indonesia to adopt stronger protection of intellectual prop-
erty. 127 Interestingly, during this entire enactment period the "theme of
Indonesia's responsibility to the world community continually reap-
pears in government statements and court judgments." 128 For example,
in a foreign trademark case, the Supreme Court announced "the Re-
public of Indonesia is an independent state which participates in the
society of nations and is obliged also to maintain international rela-
tions with honour and respect among others, marks (trademarks) of
foreign citizens.' 1
29
Thailand, on the other hand, felt that American pressure was an
affront to its national sovereignty as well as a hindrance to its eco-
122 See UPHOFF, supra note 5, at 24-25.
123 See id. at 25 & n.20.
124 See id. at 27.
'2s See id. at 29.
'2 See id.
127 See UPHOFF, supra note 5, at 30.
'2 Id. at 33.
129 Id. at 33 (providing a quotation from an uncited Supreme Court case).
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nomic development. 130 As American pressure to adopt more stringent
standards continued, the Thai public became bitter about this "trade
harassment."1 31 Later, factions within the Thai government dissuaded
the government from giving in to U.S. demands and received great
applause from the Thai public.
Presumably, those nations that have applied for WTO member-
ship and have volunteered to adopt the TRIPs standards are following
the lead of countries like Singapore and Malaysia, which have seen
trade and technical development possibilities result from adopting in-
tellectual property protection. However, countries like Vietnam have
yet to take the bold strides forward like Singapore. Issues of national
sovereignty and pride underlay these countries' standstill approach.
Moreover, factions within the various governments may disrupt at-
tempts to adopt rules that are seemingly dictated from the West.
132
Sanctions, such as those imposed by the United States, have been met
with mixed results. Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia adopted
strong intellectual property protection under the promise of joint ven-
tures and rising status among nations. 133 Thailand, on the other hand,
was driven to further reticence by continuous U.S. pressure. Uphoff
points out that while dollar losses to piracy dropped significantly in
the region, the stature and reputation of the United States has steadily
dropped. While all four governments admit to the benefits of stronger
intellectual property protection, they perceive the policy of the United
States as strictly benefiting U.S. business interests and illustrating its
130 See id. at 38.
131 See id. at 45.
132 See Hansen, supra note 36, at 582.
133 See Uphoff, supra note 5, at 12, 14-19 (illustrating that joint ventures and na-
tional pride proved to be greater motivators to stiffer intellectual property laws than
trade sanctions).
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inability to continue as a leader of free trade.1M Thus, U.S. sanctions
are generally ineffectual at abating piracy of intellectual property.
135
Fortunately, the TRIPs Agreement is equipped with some flexi-
bility to account for the varying cultural and political backgrounds of
different countries. This concession will hopefully be sufficient to
avoid alienating developing countries. Although cultural differences
may make consensus difficult, keeping them in mind may aid in the
accomplishment of enacting effective intellectual property laws.13
6
This concern for differing cultural heritage and philosophy may avoid
the problems created by the West's dictated terms and "crass" intel-
lectual property imperialism. National sovereignty would not be chal-
lenged and local feelings would not be offended by an intellectual
property agreement that leaves room for the cultural realities and
tastes of individual states. Despite this flexibility, TRIPs is perceived
by developing countries as primarily benefiting the economic interests
of developed nations.137 Hopefully the flexibility and broad language
134 According to Uphoff, U.S. policy is:
[W]idely perceived as a campaign to protect American business interests and
to divert domestic attention from the U.S. budget deficit. The unilateralism
and inconsistency of U.S. intellectual policy and other trade policies has been
taken as proof of the United State's economic decline and of its unwillingness
or inability to continue as a leader of international free trade ....
[G]overnment officials in those countries have expressed the belief that the
U.S. cannot be trusted to follow an equitable and consistent trade policy and
have begun trying to decrease their dependence on the United States.
UPHOFF, supra note 5, at 22.
135 See id.
136 In the context of cultural diversity, Long points out that:
Uniformity... may be possible where nations work toward standards that
balance the legitimate concerns of both owners and users. Those standards
must also provide sufficient flexibility so that countries can select the phi-
losophical foundations and procedures in keeping with their own culture and
heritage, while still achieving the goal of uniform protection of technology.
Such standards must be based on a realistic appraisal of the fundamental eco-
nomic impact that any protection scheme has on both developed and develop-
ing nations.
Long, supra note 5, at 169-70.
137 See Oddi, supra note 5, at 455. (stating "[t]he big winners under patent TRIPs
would clearly be those enterprises (read multinational corporations) in developed
countries that create inventions and are heavily engaged in international trade.");
Gana, supra note 3, at 744 (agreeing with the "prevailing wisdom" that TRIPs is
designed to benefit developed countries' economic interests).
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of TRIPs will allow countries to turn TRIPs to their benefit in the
end. 
138
VI. TRIPS
"The TRIPs Agreement is ... to date ... the most comprehensive
multilateral agreement on intellectual property." 139 TRIPs incorporates
the main provisions of WIPO, the Paris Convention, and the Berne
Convention as well as a number of additional obligations in areas
where the previous agreements were seen to be inadequate.' n It cov-
ers copyright, trademarks, geographical indications, industrial de-
signs, patents, integrated circuit layout, trade secrets, and test data. 141
The minimum standards of protection to be provided in each area are
set out along with definitions, the rights conferred, exceptions, and
minimum duration. TRIPs provides for enforcement measures through
its use of civil and administrative procedures and remedies.'42 Provi-
131 See Long, supra note 5, at 161 (providing that Article 10 of TRIPs, by virtue of
its broad language, "allows for a wide diversity in the nature of the procedures util-
ized.") "[T]he TRIPs Agreement is not intended to be a strict instrument, but one
capable of development." Otten & Wager, supra note 65, at 413.
139 An Overview of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights (TRIPs Agreement) (visited Mar. 16, 1998) <http://www.wto.org/
wto/intellec/intell2.html> [hereinafter TRIPs Overview]; see Reichman, supra note
2, at 345 (providing a complete summation and analysis of the effectiveness of the
various parts of the TRIPs Agreement).
140 See TRIPs Overview, supra note 139. See also TRIPs Agreement, supra note 7,
arts. 2 & 9 (stating that WTO Members shall comply with Articles 1 through 12 and
19 of the Paris Convention and Articles 1 through 21, excluding Article 6b, of the
Berne Convention). TRIPs sought to add new obligations and make existing ones
more effective. See Otten & Wager, supra note 65, at 397. The Berne and Paris
Conventions have been criticized for their failure to provide for enforcement proce-
dures and substantive norms by which to follow. See Abbot, supra note 4, at 702-07.
141 See generally TRIPs Agreement, supra note 7, arts. 9-40 (providing the standards
concerning the availability, scope, and use of intellectual property rights under Part
II of the TRIPs Agreement).
142 Articles 42 through 48 of the TRIPs Agreement provide civil and administrative
procedures and remedies. Specifically, Article 42 sets forth requirements for written
notice, rights to counsel, and other procedures designed to ensure due process. Arti-
cle 42 provides evidentiary rules and guidelines for their application. Articles 44
through 46 authorize courts to order injunctions, payment of damages, and the de-
struction of infringing goods, respectively. Article 48 entitles judicial authorities to
order compensation from those who have abused the enforcement procedures. See
TRIPs Agreement, supra note 7, arts. 42-48; see also TRIPs Overview, supra note
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sions on criminal procedures are also included.' 43 Additionally, TRIPs
provides for dispute settlement between countries. Disputes arising
between WTO members in relation to TRIPs are subject to the WTO's
dispute settlement procedures."44 The obligations in the treaty apply
equally to all members while developing countries are given a grace
period of between one to eleven years depending upon the country's
economic status to phase in all of TRIPs' standards. 45 While TRIPs
explicitly incorporates the Paris and Berne Conventions, 146 the moral
rights obligations of the Berne convention are excluded.' 47
The preamble sets out TRIPs' general goals. They are to "reduce
distortions and impediments to international trade, . . promote effec-
tive and adequate protection of intellectual property rights, and ...
ensure that measures and procedures to enforce intellectual property
rights do not themselves become barriers to legitimate trade. The
WTO points out that these goals should be understood in accordance
with article 7, which delineates TRIPs' objectives.' 49 The objectives
state that
The protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights should
... contribute to [1] the promotion of technological innovation, [... 2]
the transfer and dissemination of technology, [... 3] the mutual advan-
tage of producers and users of technological knowledge ... in a man-
ner conducive to social and economic welfare, and ... 4] a balance of
rights and obligations.50
Article 8 provides that appropriate measures consistent with
TRIPs' provisions "may be needed to prevent the abuse of intellectual
139 (summarizing those aspects of TRIPs that focus on civil and administrative pro-
cedures and remedies such as due process, rules of evidence, judicial authority to
order instructions, and disposals for infringed goods).
143 See TRIPs Agreement, supra note 7, art. 61 (providing criminal procedures for
willful violation of trademark and large-scale piracy).
144 See TRIPs Overview, supra note 139.
145 Articles 65 and 66 of the TRIPs Agreement provide transitional arrangements for
developing and least developed countries. Article 65 permits developing countries,
which have met certain minimum standards, to delay full implementation until Janu-
ary 1, 2000. Article 66 specifies that least developed countries have until January 1,
2005 to be in full compliance. See TRIPs Agreement, supra note 7, arts. 65-66.
146 See id. arts. 2 & 9.
147 See id. at art. 9.
148 Id. at 1197.
149 See TRIPs Overview, supra note 139.
150 TRIPs Agreement, supra note 7, art. 7.
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property rights by right holders or the resort to practices which unrea-
sonably restrain trade or adversely affect the international transfer of
technology. ' ' 151 However, TRIPs fails to explain how far a country
may go to protect against the unfair restraint of trade or how to bal-
ance the protections of intellectual property rights with technology
transfer.
TRIPs offers specific provisions on intellectual property rights
protection but lists these goals without providing any guidance that
would help developing countries realize the benefits of these objec-
tives. While industries in developed nations would immediately bene-
fit from the specifics of the TRIPs Agreement, it is unclear what im-
mediate benefits would flow to the newly developed or developing
country. 152 It is as if these objectives are a rhetorical device to encour-
age the adoption of TRIPs. However, as was the case with Singapore,
adoption of stricter intellectual property rules permitted joint ventures
with computer companies who refused to do business in Singapore
before stricter laws were enforced.153
TRIPs not only includes the five traditional forms of intellectual
property, but also adds some related provisions as well.54
A. Copyright
First, TRIPs includes provisions for copyright protection.155 From
the Berne Convention, the term of protection for copyright is the life of
the author plus fifty years. 156 The author is granted the right of making
and authorizing translations and reproductions. 57 However, quotations
and limited reproduction for press purposes are permissible without au-
thorization. 158 Creators of literary and dramatic works enjoy the exclusive
right of authorizing performances, broadcasts, and public recitations. 59
Infringing works and reproductions are subject to seizure provided that
1 Id. at art. 8.
152 See UPHOFF, supra note 5, at 15-19.
153 See id. at 19.
154 See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
155 See generally TRIPs Agreement, supra note 7, arts. 9-14 (providing standards for
copyright protection and related rights).
156 See Berne Convention, supra note 62, at art. 7.
157 See id. arts. 8 & 9.
151 See id. arts. 10 & 10bis.
159 See id. arts. 11, 1Ibis, 11ter, 12, & 1 4 b's.
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the work is protected by intellectual property laws. 16° TRIPs adds that
computer programs and databases are protected as literary works under
copyright and, therefore, all the same Berne provisions apply to computer
programs and databases. 161 Finally, authors of computer programs and
cinematographic works have the right to authorize or prohibit commer-
cial rental. 
1 6
B. Patents
Under TRIPs, patents receive twenty years protection from the filing
date.163 "[P]atents shall be available for any inventions, whether products
or processes, in all fields of technology, provided that they are new, in-
volve an inventive step and are capable of industrial application.
''64
TRIPs provides three exceptions to this general rule: (1) inventions that
are against or contrary to morality or ordre public, 65 (2) diagnostic,
therapeutic, and surgical methods for humans and animals,'6 and (3)
plants and animals. 1°7 Patents provide exclusive rights to prevent third
160 See id. art. 16.
161 See TRIPs Agreement, supra note 7, art. 10.
162 See id., art. 11. Related rights dealing with phonograms and broadcasting organi-
zations is found in Article 14. Id.
163 See id., art. 33.
164 Id. art 27.
165 See id. See also Timothy G. Ackerman, Disorderly Loopholes: TRIPs Patent
Protection, GAIT, and the ECJ, 32 'TEX. INT'L L. J. 489, 510 (1997) (stating that the
exception may allow countries to restrict the appropriation of patents for economic
reasons by declaring it to be for the ordre public). Ackerman further states that ex-
isting jurisprudence limits this loophole in the TRIPs Agreement:
If the limitations created by ECJ and GATT jurisprudence are applied to the
TRIPs exclusion clause, the limitations effectively and appropriately constrain
the parties to TRIPs. The guidance allows states to protect ordre public and
morality without allowing those same states to derogate from the TRIPs
agreement on economic grounds outside the intended scope of the agreement.
The prohibitions on discrimination as to national origin and on the use of eco-
nomic interests as a basis for derogation from fundamental principles provide
the guidance necessary to limit TRIPs 27(2). Thus, while TRIPs does provide
an escape hatch, it does not provide a wide-open door.
Id.
166 See TRIPs Agreement, supra note 7, art. 27.
167 See id.
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parties from "making, using, offering for sale, selling, or importing" any
patented product or process.
168
C. Trademarks
TRIPs covers trademark and its extension - geographical indica-
tions. "Any sign, or any combination of signs, capable of distinguishing
the goods or services of one undertaking from those of other undertak-
ings, shall be capable of constituting a trademark., 169 The registered
trademark owner has the exclusive right to use the mark and prevent third
parties from using similar marks to prevent consumer confusion. 170 A
trademark is renewable every seven years indefinitely.'1 However, the
registration may be canceled after three uninterrupted years of non-use. 172
Also, geographical indications can only be affixed to products that actu-
ally originated from the identified region. 173
D. Trade Secrets
Undisclosed information or trade secrets receive protection under
TRIPs. To receive protection, the information must be secret, have com-
mercial value because it is a secret, and reasonable steps must have been
taken to keep it secret. 174 Additionally, TRIPs requires that signatory
countries protect the layout design of integrated circuits according to the
Treaty on Intellectual Property in Respect of Integrated Circuits (IPIC)
negotiated in 1989 under WIPO. 175
VII. VIETNAM
Turning full attention to Vietnam, the above discussion should
make clear the number of issues and factors relevant to the adoption
of TRIPs. Implementation of TRIPs involves, on the most basic level,
the adoption of the TRIPs' minimum standards and those enforcement
measures summarized above. However, for the adoption of TRIPs'
standards to be effective and beneficial, Vietnam must also consider
its economic, cultural, and social needs and avoid a mere adoption of
"6 Id. art 28.
169 Id. art 15.
170 See. id. art. 16.
171 See TRIPs Agreement, supra note 7, art. 18.
172 See id. art. 19.
"' See id. art. 22.
'74 See id. art. 39.
'75 See id. art. 35.
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terms dictated by the West, which may engender resentment." 6
Rather, the flexibility of TRIPs will allow Vietnam's intellectual
property rights system to have a unique flavor in keeping with the
special needs and desires of the country.177 Further, Vietnam should
adopt TRIPs in an atmosphere of free-trade and competition. This will
encourage joint ventures with outside firms, spur innovation in Viet-
nam, and ensure copyright and patent protection. 178 Undoubtedly,
Vietnam will have to consider the cost of implementing, administer-
ing, and providing the training for this system of protection and incen-
tives.
179
Vietnam's intellectual property laws have been called "paper ti-
gers" - laws that the public does not obey and the government does
176 See Uphoff supra, note 70.
177 See TRIPs Agreement, supra note 7, at preamble. The TRIPs Agreement claims
that one of the goals of the agreement is to recognize "the special needs of the least-
developed country Members in respect of maximum flexibility in then domestic
implementation of laws and regulations" which presumably allows countries to in-
corporate their unique approaches to social structure into their intellectual property
laws. However, they TRIPs Agreement goes on to state that the purpose of this
flexibility is to only allow for the creation of a "sound and viable technological
base." Id.
178 Singapore successfully encouraged joint ventures with U.S. computer companies
by enacting stricter intellectual property laws. See UPHOFF, supra note 5, at 15-17.
179 See Gana, supra note 3, at 774 (stating that the greatest obstacle to the TRIPs
Agreement is the "costs of education, administration, and implementation"). See
also U.N. CONFERENCE, supra note 69, at 1-2 (noting the implementation, economic
costs, and administrative requirements of an effective intellectual property system).
The problem of meeting these costs is mentioned, but solutions are not obvious. The
U.N. Conference states that "[i]t would be unfortunate if implementing the required
arrangements were to result in the diversion of excessive resources from basic social
and economic programmes, particularly in the least developed countries." Id., 13,
at 2. However, the U.N. Conference steps over this concern by implying that the
developed countries should finance the costs of implementation. "[T]he commit-
ments made particularly in favour of the LDCs for technical assistance and financial
support need to be translated into action and made effective without delay." Id. Kas-
tenmeier & Beier recommend the use of user fees to force creators and inventors
from the developed world to offset the cost of the "development of a registration and
enforcement system." Kastenmeier & Beier, supra note 5, at 303. Abbot recom-
mends that the "industrialized countries should provide trade concessions to the ex-
tent necessary to ameliorate short-term economic dislocations in the developing
countries resulting from the adoption of new intellectual property rules." Abbot,
supra note 4, at 695.
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not enforce.180 In an attempt to counter this appellation and jump-start
its "bleak economic situation," the socialist government of Vietnam
instituted Doi Moi, "a country-wide plan of economic renovation and
improvement designed to attract foreign trade and investment. Under
Doi Moi, one of the first priorities of the Vietnamese Government was
to facilitate the influx of foreign trade and revenues into its borders
and, eventually, to its impoverished people."1
81
Doi Moi prompted the Vietnamese government to apply for
membership to the WTO.182 As of the writing of this Note, Vietnam's
laws fell below the minimum TRIPs' standards for WTO membership.
While Doi Moi resulted in a number of laws dealing with intellectual
property rights including the rights of foreigners, these laws consti-
tuted "a patchwork of poorly coordinated individual regulations which
... were vaguely drafted and lacked adequate implementing legisla-
,,183tion... Nevertheless, Vietnam's efforts "represented a respectable
attempt to create the country's first body of intellectual property law
basically from scratch." 184
Vietnamese law specifies six areas of intellectual property protec-
tion: copyright, trademarks, inventions, utility solutions, industrial
designs, and appellations of origin.1 85
A. Copyright
Vietnam's current copyright law appears to be in a state of limbo.
The Civil Code of Vietnam took effect on July 1, 1996, (Civil Code) 18 6
and repealed the Ordinance on Protection of Copyrights, which was
180 See Than Nguyen Luu, Note, To Slay a Paper Tiger: Closing the Loopholes in
Vietnam's New Copyright Laws, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 821, 822 (1996).
181 Id. at 824. Doi Moi has been credited for overcoming the recession and social
crisis that beset Vietnam during the 70s and early 80s. From 1991 to 1993, GDP
reportedly grew at a rate of 7.2% per year. "Gross productivity of industry" was
increased an average of 12% per year. See TERENCE LIM & Guo LH CHYI, VIET-
NAM: RISKS, REWARDS, AND REGULATIONS iv (1994).
182 See TRIPs Overview, supra note 139.
'83 Gregory Buhyoff, Changes to the Intellectual Property Framework, VIETNAM
Bus. J., Apr. 10, 1997, at 46.
194 Id.
5 See ANNE C. M. J. SCHOT, LEGAL ASPECTS OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN THE SO-
CIALIST REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM 269, & n.2 (1996) (noting that Vietnam has not yet
implemented any legislation for appellations of origin).
186 See Buhyoff, supra note 183, at 46.
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passed in 1994, (Ordinance).'" 7 There is currently no copyright protection
for foreign works in Vietnam. Under the Ordinance, copyright protection
exited for a number of literary, scientific, and cultural works regardless
of their form.188 Duration of the protection generally lasted for the au-
thor's life plus fifty years. Television shows and movies enjoyed protec-
tion for fifty years.lg9 Copyright infringement, under the Ordinance, ex-
cluded reproduction for private use, research, quotes, and translations
and copying for non-profit purposes required neither permission nor
payment of royalties. 19 Remedies included requesting the infringer to
cease and publicly apologize, asking a state administrative body for reso-
lution, and filing a claim with a people's court.191 Most notoriously, the
Ordinance contained a thirty-day rule. While Vietnamese authors enjoyed
the full protection provided by the law, foreign authors had to publish the
work in Vietnam within thirty days of publishing the work elsewhere in
order to receive protection in Vietnam. This law, the only one that per-
tained specifically to copyright protection of foreign works, was repealed
by the Civil Code and nothing has replaced it. 193
Works which are contrary to Vietnamese politics, encourage vio-
lence or depravity, disclose state and Party secrets, or misinterpret
Vietnamese history are denied protection under current Vietnamese
law.i 4 These and other laws essentially amount to censorship provi-
sions. 95 Vietnamese law denies protection to "works that 'propagate
violence or wars of aggression,' induce hatred, disseminate 'reaction-
ary ideas,' 'prurient lifestyles,' 'inhumane acts,' 'social vices,' 'su-
perstition,' or undermine 'traditions and customs.""' 196 Moreover,
Vietnamese law, as of 1995, "denie[d] copyright protection to works
that repudiate the achievements of the communist revolution, offend
the honor of 'distinguished persons' or national heroes, or injure the
7 See id. at 48.
188 See Schot, supra note 185, at 285.
9 See id. at 286.
"9 See id. at 287.
191 See id.
192 See Luu, supra note 157, at 838.
193 See Buhyoff, supra note 183, at 48 (stating that Decree No. 76/CP delayed dis-
cussion over the subject of copyright protection for foreign IP products to "future
legislation").
194 See Schot, supra note 185, at 285.
'95 Cf. Luu, supra note 181, at 841-42 (identifying those subject matters that are not
protected by the copyright provisions of the Vietnamese Civil Code).
196 Id. at 842 (citing Vietnam's Civil Code art. 749(b)).
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reputation of 'an organization. '""97 Another feature of the Vietnamese
law allows for "unlimited use of a theatrical work or other type of 'ar-
tistic performance,' without permission or remuneration, as long as
the use occurs during a 'cultural entertainment event' or public politi-
cal 'campaign activity.' '' 198 Given the sparse enforcement provisions,
the broad exceptions, and the vague wording, it is difficult to see how
the author has any rights against government appropriation of his/her
work.
B. Trademarks
Vietnamese law recognizes trademarks for goods, services, and
marks and requires registration prior to their protection. 199 Since 1993,
Vietnam has used a first-to-file rule, which gives trademark protection in
Vietnam to whomever is the first to file there.2° An exception is made
for "world-famous" marks. 2 1 Further, the trademark must not be insuffi-
ciently distinctive, widely used generically, considered contrary to public
policy or "socialist morality," or identical to a previously registered
mark.2°2 The National Office of Industrial Property (NOW) manages all
registration, but the process is slow, due to its reliance on an inefficient
computer system.2
0 3
Enforcement may be accomplished by obtaining an opinion from
the NOIP determining whether the trademark has been violated.2°4 Be-
cause the Vietnamese are not familiar with the way brand-names work
in a developed country, infringers are usually unaware that they are
doing anything wrong. After obtaining a decision from the NOIP, an
advisory warning letter to the party typically curbs further unauthor-
ized usage.205 Criminal penalties, reserved for organized, repeat of-
fenses, range from six months imprisonment to the death penalty. W
6
'97 Id. (citing Vietnam's Civil Code art. 749(d)).
198 Id. at 845 (citing Vietnam's Civil Code art. 761(f)) (noting that the drafters ex-
cluded a definition for "cultural entertainment activity").
'99 See Schot, supra note 185, at 270.
moo See id. at 271.
20' Id.; Buhyoff, supra note 183 (while the new scheme preserves the first-to-file
rule, it is not clear if it maintains the "world-famous" mark exception to the rule).
m See Schot, supra note 185, at 273.
203 See id. (noting that search procedures can take up to seven months).
204 See id. at 275.
205 See id.
206 See id. at 276.
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Further, "it should be noted that courts in Vietnam are not very ex-
perienced in adjudicating disputes regarding industrial property."2
C. Inventions (Patents)
Under current Vietnamese law, inventions may be protected as
patents for invention or certificates of innovation.20 After registration,
the NOIP determines whether the invention is sufficiently novel,
shows inventive creativity, and is practically applicable to receive
protection.2 Patents are valid for twenty years. Certain inventions
"related to national defense and security, medicines, disease treat-
ment, chemical substances and food products may not be eligible for
patenting," but may receive a Certificate of Innovation.2 11 A Certifi-
cate of Innovation gives the government the exclusive right to exploit
the invention while the author/creator enjoys remuneration. Inven-
tions with a lesser degree of novelty are considered a utility solution
and granted a lesser degree of protection.213
D. Trade Secrets and Mask Works
Trade secrets are not specifically provided for under Vietnamese
law. However, the current law expands industrial property rights to in-
dlude "other objects stipulated by law"214 and NOIP officials believe that
this could include trade secrets.2 15 Additionally, no mention is made of
protection for chip design but this may ultimately fall under utility solu-
tions.
VIII. UPGRADING VIETNAM'S INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
The eight elements of a normative intellectual property regime216
provide a general guideline for the adoption of TRIPs in Vietnam.
2w See Schot, supra note 185, at 276.
201 See id. at 277; see generally Rory J. Radding & H.T. Than, Patent Protection in
Vietnam: A Business Decision, 8 TRANSNAT'L LAW 87, 89-93 (describing the current
patent law system in Vietnam and the requirements for patentability).
209 See Schot, supra note 185, at 278-9.
210 See Buhyoff, supra note 183, at 48.
211 Schot, supra note 185, at 279-80.
212 See id. at 280.
213 See id. at 281.
214 Buhyoff, supra note 183.
215 See id.
216 See SHERWOOD, supra note 11, at 28.
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Vietnam must consider and accommodate "the eight steps" and bring
them to the levels required by TRIPs in order to achieve WTO mem-
bership. 17
A. The Concept of an Exclusive Right
The concept of an exclusive right requires the superiority of individ-
ual rights over the state, while the state functions as guarantor of those
individual rights. It values individualism, individual creative effort, dis-
association with the past, and constant innovation218 - all ideals that are
in conflict with a Confucian culture, like that of Vietnam.
The Vietnamese recognize Chinese culture "as the wellspring of
their civilization. 2 19 Thus, unlike other Southeast Asian countries that
looked to India and Buddhism for cultural and social principles, Viet-
nam looked to China and Confucianism. 220 In traditional Vietnam,
scholar-officials called mandarins administered governmental af-
fairs. 221 The mandarins, as well as the emperor, focused their efforts
on the maintenance of social and cosmic order. The achieved this
through ethical action based upon Confucian ideals. The most im-
portant of these ideals included the promotion of the five fundamental
relationships of society and the evincing of the five basic virtues.223
The five fundamental relationships are "the relationships between
ruler and his subjects, between father and son, between husband and
wife, between elder brother and younger brother, and between friend
and friend. ' 2 4 Conceptions of individual and society are seen in terms
of relationships. Not only does the individual define himself or herself
in terms of kinship relationships at the family level, but also on
broader political and social levels.22 Traditional Vietnamese society
217 Id.
218 See Hamilton, supra note 83, 616-20.
219 CHARLES F. KEYES, THE GOLDEN PENINSULA: CULTURE AND ADAPTATION IN
MAINLAND SOUTHEAST ASIA 183 (1995).
220 See id. at 181.
22' See id. at 186.
222 See id. at 195 (explaining that the five basic virtues are human heartedness,
righteousness, proper ritual conduct, wisdom, and good faith).
m Id.
n4 Id.
225 KEYES, supra note 219, at 195 Keyes observes that:
[t]he five relationships define a society based on personalistic connections
rather than on universalistic premises. Fundamental to these personalistic
connections was kinship and the kinship idiom was used in defining relation-
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is based on ideals in terms of relationships rather than universalistic
principles that accrue to each individual separate and apart from the
group .226
Hence, the relationship between ruler and ruled takes on a pater-
nalistic flavor.227 It is the ruler's duty to control the flow of informa-
tion to the populace and carefully ensure that Confucian virtues and
truth are promotedYm Thus, the printing and dissemination of books,
ideas, and art become of central concern to the government, not in or-
der to protect individual rights of the author/inventor, but to ensure
that only ennobling and acceptable material is made available to the
family/country.
This is a key problem in implementing TRIPs in Vietnam because
the concept of intellectual property rights is based on assumptions and
notions alien to Vietnam. Vietnamese law grants the government
broad exceptions especially in terms of the subject matter of a copy-
right evidencing a lingering paternalistic concern for information pre-
sented to individuals. The strong notions of individualism are, hence,
replaced by kinship notions in Vietnam.
B. Mechanism for Exclusive Rights
The mechanisms for exclusive rights, however, are not as problem-
atic. Vietnam already has a government agency in place to register pat-
ents or trademarks. Additionally, Vietnam has thorough registration pro-
cedures.229 The primary concerns here are long processing times for
trademark applications and other inefficiencies due to a lack of reliable
ships among those who were not actual kinsmen. In particular, the Emperor
was conceived of and regarded as a superior father, whereas his subjects were
viewed as children. As in China, no religious priesthood could appeal to gen-
eral principles that were applicable to rulers as to the ruled.
Id.
226 See id.
227 See ALFORD, supra note 47, at 23 & n.99.
m See generally id. at 19-22 (describing the ruler-subject relationship in Chinese
society). "Chinese political philosophers ... have.., emphasized the human ten-
dency to become deluded through the interplay of 'false' and 'correct' doctrine. In
his role as fiduciary, the ruler had an affirmative obligation to filter out and destroy
harmful knowledge." Id. at 23 & n.lO0.
22 See Schot, supra note 185, at 272, 278 (listing the registration requirements for
patent and trademark, which generally includes a filing fee, translations, or descrip-
tion of product or mark).
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computer technology or other innovations to help the NOIP run more
efficiently.
230
C. Duration
Duration simply involves specifying lengths of time within which
exclusive intellectual property rights remain vested in the owner or crea-
tor. Under the 1996 Civil Code, Vietnam brought its protection duration
into compliance with that required by TRIPs for patent, trademark, and
domestic copyright.231
D. Public Interest
The supervening public interest category is another problematic
area. Protecting public morals is an area of governmental concern that
justifies reducing the exclusivity of intellectual property rights. 2 How-
ever, this protection is applied on a limited basis. As previously dis-
cussed, the issue of promoting public morals takes a broader conception
in Vietnam.233 TRIPs does restrict protection on plant and animal patents,
but Vietnam's broad copyright exceptions concerning subject matter of a
work may not fit within the confines of the ordre public or morality ex-
ceptions provided by the Berne convention.
Further, the intervening public interest of a developing country
requires additional exceptions. A developing country must first lay the
foundations for a viable technology infrastructure in order to promote
innovation. As was the case with India and Japan, loose patent protec-
tion can promote technological developments in those countries.-Z
E. Negotiability
The concept of negotiability is neither addressed by Vietnamese law
nor by TRIPs. However, as the Vietnamese become more accustomed to
working with these types of rights, the negotiability of intellectual prop-
erty rights is likely to develop and become an area seriously contem-
plated by the dictates of Vietnamese law.
230 See id.
231 See supra note 183 and accompanying text.
232 See SHERWOOD, supra note 11, at 32.
233 See supra note 194 and accompanying text.
234 See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
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F. Trans-border Comity
Vietnam's application of TRIPs and, if successful, membership in
the WTO will satisfy this element making intellectual property rights ef-
ficacious across its borders. Intellectual property created in Vietnam will
then enjoy protection more generally abroad. The biggest gap thus far is
the failure of Vietnam's laws to provide for copyright protection for for-
eigners. But that will be presumably remedied with future legislation.
G. Enforcement
While Vietnam has enforcement provisions in its laws, these rely
almost exclusively on administrative or criminal avenues.235 Strong intel-
lectual property enforcement presupposes a well-developed legal system
with expertise in handling such difficulties. As mentioned, Vietnam's
expertise in these areas is limited and its laws at times nonexistent. The
TRIPs Agreement requires stringent enforcement, which may prove ex-
pensive.
The U.N. Conference on Trade and Development identified five
areas that developing countries must address when creating enforce-
ment and administrative mechanisms up to par and in line with those
required by TRIPs. 6 The first recommendation is "improving the
relevant legal framework inline with the general obligations of ... the
Agreement .... "7 This may be difficult for Vietnam given the rela-
tively undeveloped nature of its civil legal systems. However, Viet-
nam's more established criminal systems may be used to provide the
commensurate enforcementY 8 The second includes, "strengthening or
establishing the relevant administrative offices." 239 Such a strengthen-
ing could include setting up a network of patent offices and other of-
fices equipped with the latest computer technology to ensure that in-
tellectual property is efficiently administered.m This type of adminis-
25 See Schot, supra note 185, at 275-76 (describing the available enforcement
measures). See generally Luu, supra note 181, at 849-58 (reviewing the ineffective-
ness of Vietnam's enforcement provisions under both the Ordinance and the Civil
Code and proposing specific modifications to these laws that will bring Vietnam
into conformity with the Berne Convention and GATr).
236 See U.N. CONFERENCE, supra note 69, 11 71-76, at 19-20.
2 Id. at 20.
238 See Long, supra note 5, at 169.
239 U.N. CONFERENCE, supra note 69, at 20.
20 In India, commentators indicated the country's need to modernize its patent of-
fice because manual searches were creating a backlog of applications for patent pro-
tection. India's modernization program included a computerized information system
1999] 249
CASE W. RES. J INT'L L.
trative development will be very expensive for Vietnam, but possibly
the added efficiencies will help offset these expenses. The third rec-
ommendation suggests "enhancing enforcement mechanisms of the
relevant laws and regulations." 24' This area may need to be closely
watched by the West given that many developing countries will need
to rely on police forces, unencumbered with concerns about human
rights, to enforce intellectual property rights. The fourth recommenda-
tion is to increase the training of personnel to administer and enforce
rights. 242 The last recommendation is that countries adopting TRIPs
must increase their "capability to monitor transfer of technology ar-
rangements within and between enterprises, along with ensuring that
competition authorities are knowledgeable about potential [intellec-
tual property rights] abuses."2 43 Again, this will be a very expensive
undertaking for Vietnam requiring a drawing up of administrative
procedures, creating well-equipped offices, training personnel, and
training the general populace. Cost is a pervasive feature of these rec-
ommendations since most lesser developed countries like Vietnam
lack administrative and judicial structures necessary to enforce intel-
lectual property rights. Hopefully increased filing fees or other fees
collected on patent or copyright applications may mitigate implemen-
tation and ongoing administrative costs.
H. Transition arrangements
Transition arrangements protect ideas before they are ready for the
market. Under current Vietnamese law, transition arrangements are not
available. This problem may be resolved by Vietnam through adopting
TRIPs, which provides protection for trade secrets. However, as men-
tioned, trade secrets as yet do not receive official protection.
IX. CONCLUSION
Unfortunately, the discussion ends on an uncertain note. The goal
of developing countries is presumably to improve standards of living
for their citizens, an objective to be accomplished through legal en-
actments. Clearly, however, copying the legal structure or laws of de-
veloped countries will not accomplish this given the fundamental so-
that links patent offices. Similarly, Malaysia has computerized its administrative
systems facilitating searches of trademark and patent files. See U.N. CONFERENCE,
supra note 69, 97-98, at 24-25.
241 Id.
242 See id.
243 Id.
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cial and cultural differences between the inhabitants of the West and
lesser developed countries. The change must come from a more fun-
damental level. Ultimately, each country, given its unique system and
culture, will need to cultivate notions of value and attitudes that will
give rise to uniquely tailored laws that will engender greater individ-
ual economic well-being. Thus, while Vietnam may adopt intellectual
property laws that mirror the requirements of TRIPs, the cultural and
political assumptions behind Western conceptions of intellectual
property rights may create resentment, lax enforcement, dependent
technological systems, and other unforeseen problems that will under-
cut the promises of the WTO and TRIPs.
Advocates of the intellectual property rights system "assert that
the main goal of such a system should be to create economic incen-
tives that maximize the discounted present value of the difference be-
tween the social value and social costs of information creation and
transfer."244 Though the promise of TRIPs is economic prosperity and
technological development, the reality is that "strengthening the IPR
system alone, while bearing some potential for expanding access to
trade.., and technology, is liable to be of little value unless done in a
coherent framework of broader policies."245 The United Nations rec-
ommends that intellectual property rights "be implemented in such a
way as to promote dynamic competition through the acquisition and
local development of technology in an environment that is conducive
to growth." This acknowledges that growth and economic prosper-
ity will not come just from stiffer laws on patents and copyright, but it
must be coupled with an economic system which is founded on free
market principles. Strong intellectual property protection is only one
factor that contributes to economic development and technological
innovation.
With TRIPs, it is clear that developed countries will achieve
greater protection for their companies' products and individual's in-
novation. However, if developing countries want to become technol-
ogy producers, they must have in place "strong property systems, sta-
ble government, free market capitalism, and zealous protection of
corporate interests, ' 247 all of which fall outside the purview of intel-
lectual property law and cannot be dictated by treaty from the West.
244 Id. at 14.
245 U.N. CONFERENCE, supra note 69, at 22; .... [The role of patents has been
found to be very insignificant in transfer of technology transactions." Verma supra
note 109, at 353.
246 U.N. CONFERENCE, supra note 69, at 22.
247 Gana, supra note 3, at 738.
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